Paris Agreement Compliance Committee

Civil society, the most egregious, in the form of a WRI PACT1 document, pushes for sanctions that, by definition, are punishable. Wordings such as “suspension of rights and privileges”, regardless of the accompanying text and good intentions, tend to reinforce the positions previously defended by extremists on both sides of the debate. This is not just a tactical error or a diplomatic error, but a misunderstanding on the point mentioned above: the Paris Agreement is not the Kyoto Protocol. It is a tool that must be used in a different, subtle and equally effective way. As a general mechanism, it strikes a balance between self-made ambitions, complex reporting channels and multiple support instruments. If we present ourselves in the form of the Kyoto application, the compliance committee ceases to operate within the framework of Paris, playing on different forms of power and triggers that simply do not exist and should not exist. It relates to the negotiations themselves. Although the flow of compliance is (relatively) stable, there is no denying that it is at the center of a house of cards. Mechanisms such as the market mechanisms covered by Article 6, which is discussed with the SBSTA, the improvement of the transparency mechanism in the Apa Treaty, are attentive to the nature of the compliance requirements that can be introduced, while the flow of compliance awaits, to some extent, certain decisions in these flows before reaching an agreement. Whether in the opinions of the APA parties involved in compliance or in the discussions within the committee, as expressed in the informal note, these words are generally used as a gateway to determine acceptable outcomes or legitimate triggers. They are never applied, as their context suggests: as instruments of interpreters. Given the unusual language of the Paris Agreement – a half-legal document, a mixture of compelling and ambitious, tougher and more flexible laws, a preamble and a convention without borders – normally ethereal international obligations become even more difficult to read. As a result, the parties tend to reverse their previous assumptions – and often read the Paris Agreement in relation to the Kyoto Protocol.

This raises fears of strict compliance and, as they say, implementation. 1www.wri.org/sites/default/files/mechanism-facilitate-implementation-promote-compliance-paris-agreement-design-options.pdf called 14/5/18. Such a dialogue could develop gradually, which at least indicates that the Committee`s role as a mediator is beginning to be recognized. Let Bangkok see this flow of negotiations more turbulent, and other currents will find themselves calmer.

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